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The Warsaw Uprising is a story of several thousand Poles who, once again,
refused to accept the fate of Poland under occupation. It was ultimately their
first and last military effort for independence.(1) Those who have studied the
factors surrounding the Uprising of 1944 have established their own theories
explaining the occurrence. Joanna Hanson, who wrote The Civilian
Population and the Warsaw Uprising, says that the rising was bound to
occur as a result of living conditions. Norman Davies, who has written God's
Playground: A History of Poland, says that the Warsaw Uprising was heroic
but a mistake; that it was premature. Some, on the other hand, claim that the
Poles would have won if they were provided with Allied reinforcements and
that the uprising was not only heroic but also reasonable and sustainable.
Zawodny, who has written Nothing but Honour: The Story of the Warsaw
Uprising, a comprehensive study on the subject, strongly believes this. In the
years following the war many historians tried to analyze what happened in
Warsaw and why, yet none of them seem to agree. Each one comes to their
own conclusion. None able to agree on one analysis of the interpretation. In
order to understand the uprising one must first know the events that led up to
it.
Poland had been struggling for independence for hundreds of years.
Moreover, because of Poland's geographical location it is in my opinion that
Poland will be defending her boundaries indefinitely. The country, located
between two rival greatpowers Germany and Russia - was in the last century
considered to be a buffer state. In the 18th century it had been a battleground
for Russia, Prussia and Austria who took advantage of its weaknesses and
divided the territory through three partitions. Yet, during its time of sorrow
the Poles had organized themselves and raised their arms fighting heroically,

often empty handed. It was this heroism in the time of need that allowed
Poland to stay on the map for the century. On November 11, 1918, Poland
once again became autonomous. Unfortunately, the times of bliss did not last
very long. Twenty years later, Poland was invaded by Germany and, while
fighting on the western front, seventeen days into the battle, the country was
stabbed in tile back by the other powerful neighbor. On September 17, 1939
Poland was on the way to its fourth partition.
World War II began on September 1, 1939 at approximately 4:40 am. First, a
German battleship, the Schleswig Holstein, stationed in the Danzig port on a
friendly visit, began firing on a Polish fort. Then, one hour later, the
Wehrmacht entered Poland by land and air from the west. On September 17,
while the Polish Army was still fighting, the Soviet Army entered Poland
from the east, claiming that Poland was defeated and it was Russian
responsibility to defend Lithuania and the Soviet Union from tile German
onslaught.
The desperate battle for Poland at the outbreak of World War 11 did not last
long. The Polish Army was crushed in the last days of September and the
beginning of October in 1939. After the defeat of the Polish Army,
underground resistance flourished.(2) It became stronger as the German
forces were placed under increasing pressure by the advancing Soviets
during the summer of 1943. The objective, after the Soviet Union became an
ally in the war, was to systematically re-establish self government that was
lost in the September 1939 campaign.
Small military offensives were sparked by optimism and heightened morale
among the Polish resistance as well as by the pressure on the resistance by
the civilian population. Weapons and ammunition were stored in basements
and surrounding forests. This activity was closely monitored by the Polish
Government in Exile in London. The Poles sabotaged the Germans
numerous times, but it was not until the summer of 1944, that the Polish
underground army made a full scale effort to regain control of their capital.
The largest and primary resistance movement in Poland during the latter part
of World War 11 was organized by the Armia Krajowa (AK), also known as
the Polish Home Army. Most of these fighters were officers and soldiers
from the old Polish Army which was defeated at the end of September 1939.
In addition to the old file and rank, many Polish citizens decided to join the
resistance. Men between the ages of 16 through 60 years of age participated
in actual combat and sabotage activities. Furthermore, those who were too
young to fight or were handicapped participated in other ways than combat.
For example, children, both boys and girls, would deliver the mail to
civilians or act as secret couriers between military headquarters and the
combatants. Those men and women who worked in German factories would
steal supplies and equipment which was used to make grenades. According

to Tuvia Borzykowski, who participated in both the Ghetto Uprising of 1943
and the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, ... the civilian population became
intensely involved, In every part of the city taken over by the insurgents the
houses were decorated with Polish flags and civilians walked the streets with
radiant faces, encouraging the fighters. Old and young were out in the streets
heedless of bullets, enjoying the sight of the flags and the green uniforms of
Polish soldiers. Women came out of their houses carrying food and drink for
the fighting men, Young women became nurses, endangering their lives on
the barricades. Even children became involved. 11 and 12 year olds acted as
messengers and distributors of underground newspapers.(3)
The AK was formed from various political and ethnic groups. Many Jews
collaborated with the AK. In 1942 the Poles established the Council of
Assistance for Jews (RPZ) which saved approximately 100,00 Jews from the
German death machine.(4) The Jews had lost much of their population to
concentration camps in the previous years of the war and the Ghetto
Uprising of 1943, but, nevertheless, the Jewish people who remained free
did not give up hope and fought along side the poles.(5) Borzykowski who
fought in the Jewish Fighting Organization in the Old City said in his
memoirs, "The chief command of the People's Army cordially welcomed the
founding of a Jewish fighting unit and we were immediately granted all
privileges such as quarters, food rations etc."(6)
In 1942 the AK was joined by the Peasant Battalion (Bch) originally
established to oppose the deportation and pacification program lead by
Germany. In the summer of 1944 two additional right-wing groups joined
the Home Army. They included the National Armed Forces (NSZ) and the
National Military Organization (NOW). When referring to the AK during
the Warsaw Uprising one is really referring to all of these groups fighting
under one coherent command. Combined, they formed the single largest
resistance group in Europe at the time - approximately 400,000
participant.(7)
The conditions of the civilian population was one factor which pressured the
resistance groups to act. Ever since the 1939 occupation of Poland by
Germany, living conditions for the Poles drastically declined. The German
Governor, Ludwig Fischer, implemented what many Poles called a reign of
terror. There was to be no display of Polish culture; Polish schools were
closed. Children had to be sent to German controlled schools where many
were taught from books on nature as opposed to history, Polish language or
culture. Many parents refused to send their children to school as a result.
Polish books, dictionaries, newspapers, flags and maps were burned, and
libraries closed. Theaters catered to German citizens. The repertory of those
that admitted Poles was filled with German propaganda.(8)

Working conditions for Poles were devastating. Poles were hired as factory
workers but were not allowed to hold any managerial positions. Their pay
was close to nothing --- approximately six - ten zloty a day for a factory job
during a time when feeding a family of four cost 1,568 zloty a month.(9)
Many Poles did not work at all. As the war progresses money lost its value.
Miron Bialoszewski who was in Warsaw during the war and the Uprising
said, "Bartering sprang up ... From day to day ... a huge crowd. Standing.
Milling about ... Practically everyone held something in his hand. Anything.
Anything could be exchanged, as long as it wasn't for money. Money was
worth as much as garbage."(10) There was a shortage of housing. Many
buildings were destroyed during the German bombardment in 1939. If
housing was available, several families had to share living quarters. Two to
four families would live in one room. It was even worse during winter. The
bombing raids had knocked out most of the windows, There was no heating
when the temperature in January of 1940 fluctuated between -20' and -30'
Celsius. Families would create a campfire in a single room from furniture
they found in abandoned buildings. Others would live in crowded cellars
under the city where it was safe from the bombing raids.(11)
Food supplies were rationed. Poles in Warsaw were allowed approximately
half of a portion of bread that a German citizen was. Four hundred grams of
meat was allowed for the Pole when a German was provided with 4,000
grams. Beer, wine, cigarettes, and cheese were denied completely. While
food was sold on the black market, prices were high. In addition, any
German raid which resulted in food confiscation raised the price as much as
50%. None-the-less the black market bridged the gap between death and
survival.(12) Furthermore, clothing was too expensive to buy. A pair of
shoes in 1941 cost 600 - 700 Zloty. In 1942 only 100,000 pairs of shoes
were offered for sale for a population of over one million people living in
Warsaw.(13)
The Soviets also established various political groups within Poland. These
were not formed as military resistance groups. Russia already had their own
military and a Polish Army under Soviet command. There also existed a
Polish Communist military group within Warsaw which was not under the
direct control of the Soviets. They were called the Armia Ludowa (AL) or
the Peoples Army with approximately 10,000 participants. This group hoped
to assist the Red Army as they entered Warsaw. This group was much
smaller and less influential than the AK Ultimately they joined with the AK
in the uprising against the Germans. The communist Polska Partia
Robotnicza (PPR) also known as the Polish Worker's Party was organized in
1942 with the aid of Russia although there already existed a communist
party in Poland before the war. The Zwiazek Patriotow Polskich (ZPP), also
known as the Union of Polish Patriots, was established in 1943. This party
was established in Russia and served to organize and unite the Poles within
Russia as a military and political group, after Stalin announced in 1943 that

anyone in Russia in November 1939 was regarded as a citizen of Russia.
Willie before the war the communists were a minority group within Poland,
after the war this party served as the puppet government. Finally, after the
Uprising broke out, on July 22, 1944 the Soviets established the Polish
Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) to administer the liberated
territories of Poland.(14)
The Committee of National Liberation was probably the most influential of
all communist parties at the time. They claimed to be the legal government
of Poland at the end of World War II and, after the war, helped establish the
puppet communist government within Poland until it fell apart in the 1980's.
Gabriel Kolko, a historian, who had written Century of War believes that
Polish resistance during World War I as enigmatic; that the underground was
a substitute for Polish society and that most joined this underground to
survive rather than resist.(15) Perhaps it is true that the underground was
Polish society at the time but it is incorrect to say that it was a substitute.
After all everything about the underground was Polish, including the
majority of the people, the language, culture, and food. It would be more
appropriate to refer to the Germans who occupied Poland as a substitute
Polish society. After all they came, by force, to replace the existing society
within Poland - to substitute for that society. Because the Germans were
unsuccessful at replacing the Poles, the underground at the time was the true
Polish society.
Furthermore, when an individual or a force uses violence against an enemy
and that violence is justified and supported by the United States, England,
and Russia, one ought not call it survival but resistance. Stealing food and
clothing from tile Germans may be survival but in the larger picture, the
combined events which transpired between August 1, 1944 and October 2,
1944 was a full fledged uprising - a resistance movement as opposed to
survival.
The Warsaw Uprising was the ultimate result of a military operation code
named "Burza," also known as the "Tempest." Originally it was
implemented as a strategy to liberate Eastern Poland by fighting the
Germans in the rural areas. The plan was to move westward and fight the
German rear-guard as the Soviets pressured them to withdraw. As the
Soviets arrived the AK was to cease fighting. The goal here was to
successfully drive the Germans out and assume political control city by city.
In order to gain an upper hand politically the Polish AK needed to
participate by fighting the Germans before the Red Army could assume
control. Operation "Tempest" was, therefore, "directed militarily against tile
Germans and politically against the Russians."(16)

The military resistance against the Germans was clear. They had violated
Polish sovereignty and occupied Poland. As a result Polish resistance was
aimed at driving them out. It was an act of self defense which was justified
by German hostility and treatment of the Polish population. The AK
The political offensive against Russia was of equal importance to the Poles,
yet it was staged at a different level. Both Poland and Russia had their
differences and knew that having a common enemy did not guarantee a
relationship. On the contrary, Poland was distrustful of Russia and the
Russians of those Poles who had any responsibility during the war. They
were attacked by the Soviets at the outbreak of World War 11. Secondly
they witnessed Stalin's brutality in the Katyn forest massacre in April 1943,
where 4,321 Polish officers were found dead on land which was, at that time,
occupied by Russia. Each of these officers was found with their hands tied
behind their back and shot in the back of the head, execution style.
Furthermore, 11,000 additional officers were missing, never to be found
again. Likewise the Russians were distrustful of the Poles. They considered
Poland "the monstrous bastard of the peace of Versailles," as Molotov had
once said. Stalin referred to Poland as "Pardon the expression, a state." The
hostility between these two states existed for over 500 years and sure enough
it was not about to end now. As a result the negligent and hostile behavior of
the Russians frightened many Polish leaders. There was the constant fear
that the Soviets might want to set up Poland as a puppet communist state.
There was a further question of Lithuanian territories and to whom they
actually belonged. This was enough to convince the Polish resistance to gain
political control over individual cities before the Soviets were able to
implement Russian political control.
The Tempest was executed with mixed results. The Polish Home Army often
fought the Germans, driving them further west. Sometimes they fought
alongside the Red Army only to be ambushed by them after providing
assistance. Each time the AK would occupy a town or city, the Red Army
would arrive and replace the AK command with Polish communists loyal to
the Soviets. The Red Army, after receiving military help from the Poles,
would round up the insurgents and place them under arrest. Some of those
arrested would then be sent to the Soviet Union, others would be shot.
Furthermore, if Poland refused to fight alongside the Red Army then Russia
had a pretext to execute the Polish leaders - Poland was not fighting because
it was pro-German. This would give Stalin a reason to take Poland without
threatening allied relations. Moreover, it turns out that the AK fought for
Eastern Poland unaware that the eastern territories were already ceded to
Russia. On December 1, 1943, at the Teheran Conference, Eastern Poland
was taken by tile Russians in an agreement between Stalin, Churchill and
Roosevelt.(17) Yet, theBritish insisted that there should be a mutual
understanding between the Poles and Russians.

Although many claim that the Conference at Teheran was a secret and that
the result was a great shock and a stab in the back, I tend to disagree. The
Tehran Conference was not a secret to tile diplomats from the Polish
Government in Exile. It was only a secret to the general public and Warsaw
headquarters. Prime Minister of Poland, Mikolajczyk, was aware of the
meeting and he explained to British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden,
Poland's position regarding frontiers. He was aware that Russia claimed the
eastern territories of Poland, including Lithuania. Furthermore, Mikolajczyk
was aware of the concessions he had to make in eastern Poland for the sake
of Russo-Polish relations. Certainly he would have preferred if the borders
remained as they had been before the war in 1939. He told Eden that any
discussions of Polish frontiers should include Poland's claim to the West,
including rich German territory. Eden asked Mikolajczyk if he may address
Poland's frontier problems at Tehran. Mikolajczyk agreed. Roosevelt, on the
other hand, was not concerned so much with the frontier problem of Poland
as lie was about Russo-Polish relations. His elections were approaching and
he did not want to lose Polish votes. He was therefore willing to compromise
Poland's eastern frontier considering approximately an equal amount of land
was gained in the west. In fact, during the conference Roosevelt asked Stalin
if Poland would be proportionally compensated in tile west. Stalin answered
that lie did not know. Apparently Roosevelt was satisfied with this answer
but he showed some concern for Poland.(18) Churchill, on the other hand,
demanded a concrete answer. He insisted that Poland be compensated for the
land it gave up. Furthermore, arrangements were made with Stalin to have
the Polish population east of the Curzon line transferred within the Polish
boundaries.(19)
At first Stalin wanted the Molotov-Ribbentrop line, which was the dividing
line within Poland between Germany and Russia after Poland's defeat in
1939, to serve as the border between Poland and Russia. After realizing that
it was impossible to compensate Poland under this proposal, Russia was
persuaded to accept the Curzon Line, which was first proposed by the British
in 1920 based on ethnic factors. The line was drawn to divide the Poles from
the Lithuanians in response to the Russo-Polish dispute during the Bolshevik
Revolution. In return Poland received 150 miles of German territory in the
west, Eastern Prussia and the territories of Upper Silesia. When Mikolajczyk
learned of the agreement he expressed his opposition. But the disagreement
did not revolve around all of the ceded territories. In fact, Mikolajczyk was
willing to make amends to the boundaries. The disagreement was regarding
two important cities with large Polish populations on the border of the
Curzon line, these were Lwow and Wilno. Under the agreement they would
be ceded to Russia. When his request for the two cities was refused he asked
for additional land from Germany but this request was also denied. It was
consequently settled at the frontiers originally agreed upon at the Tehran
Conference. Under this agreement Poland was not compensated
proportionally. The territory that it lost to Russia amounted to 178,220 km2

and it gained 10 1,200 km2 , but the gains were far superior to the losses.
The German and Prussian territories were rich in coal and iron deposits
while Lithuanian land was used as farmland and held no substantial
resources. Not only did this benefit the Poles but the plan would also deprive
Germany of valuable industrial resources for tile future of the German
military after tile war.
Despite the disagreement, the headquarters in Warsaw were not notified of
the border arrangements and as a consequence did not tailor their military
plans to tile change in territory. As a result many insurgents were left
fighting the Germans on Russian land. Unfortunately, at that time the
Soviets did not recognize the AK as a combatant group and did not treat
them as prisoners of war. Instead many insurgent soldiers caught fighting the
Germans on Russian land were shot. Consequently, the relations between tile
Soviet military and the Polish Home Army may have been strained as a
result of Mikolajczyk's negligence to inform the insurgents of border
changes. It was, after all, his responsibility to inform the insurgents of any
diplomatic decisions which might affect their fighting. Unfortunately,
Mikolajczyk gave everyone the impression that relations were progressing.
In fact after a conference on August 3, 1944, between Mikolajczyk and
Molotov, the New York Times declared that "cooperation [between Poland
and Russia] so far is 'quite satisfactory.'"(20) In my opinion Tempest should
have ceased in the annexed territories until further negotiations were settled.
This would have saved many lives and possibly strengthened relations
between Polish and Soviet troops.
Although operation Tempest was designed to take place in the rural parts of
Poland, and preparations reflected this goal, the evolving events pressed for
military action in the city of Warsaw. On July 21, 1944, the Commander of
the AK, General Bor-Komorowski met with his chief of Staff, Brigadier
General Tadeusz Pelczynski and his second in command, General Leopold
Okulicki. They came to a conclusion that the time had come to rise against
the Germans who at that time were apparently removing their forces from
Warsaw in the face of the oncoming Russian Army. Stanislaw Jankowski,
Delegate and Vice-Prime Minister of the legal Polish Government who was,
at the time, the senior authority in Warsaw, gave his approval .(21)
Observing the many wounded and dead German soldiers being evacuated
from the city it was expected that the Red Army will take over within days.
But because the Polish leaders wanted to show to the west that it was
through their efforts and not the Russian's that Warsaw was liberated, they
felt obliged to act immediately. On July 25 General Bor reported to London
that the AK stood by ready to pick up their weapons. That same day the
Government in Exile authorized Jankowski to make any decisions
necessitated by the speed of the Soviet offensive, without any further
communication with London. Prime Minister Mikolajczyk made this

decision concrete by sending a telegram on July 26 to the delegate which
authorized him to "announce the beginning of the uprising at the moment
chosen by you." The Prime Minister, who was just getting ready to go to
Moscow to discuss with Stalin the matters of the border and the future shape
of Poland, wanted to have a strong argument - the military uprising for
independence - to reinforce his position.(22)
The following day, Ambassador to Great Britan Edward Raczynski paid a
visit to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and informed him about the
plans for the uprising. He suggested that a brigade of paratroopers be sent to
Warsaw, that the German Royal Air Force around Warsaw be bombed, that
long-range fighter planes be given to the disposition of tile AK, and lastly
that it be announced that the AK holds combatant rights. Eden promised to
consider these ideas. Shortly after, Raczynski received a letter from Sir
Orme Sargent of the British Foreign Office stating that Britain lacked the
technical capabilities to assist Poland and "therefore, there is nothing that
His Majesty's Government can do in this conexion...."(23) Meanwhile, a
Polish paratroops brigade stood by ready to go to Warsaw. Again England
refused to transport them because according to British Field Marshall Alan
F. Brooke, "Large numbers of transport aircraft would be required for this
purpose, and these could not be spared at this critical stage of the campaign
in the west ."(24) While the Polish paratroops brigade refused to eat in
protest, no one troubled to inform General Bor, even after the rising began,
that assistance was not coming. It seems that vital information was withheld
often from the AK Not only was the Home Army already fighting on Soviet
land without knowing it, now they were about to engage in a full scale
uprising under the impression that aid was on its way. With the proper
information the AK command could have conformed their decisions
regarding the time and place of the uprising.
The fact that they did not receive combatant rights did not impede their
resistance efforts. Combatant rights would not have led to victory. But it did
mean that many insurgent lives were lost unnecessarily as a result. The
allies, when making the decision not to grant combatant rights, may have
thought that a combined and coordinated effort among the Poles and
Russians would have meant an easier victory. This was, in fact, what
England wanted - cooperation among the two. The mentality of the Polish
and Russian governments, and the fact that each had conflicting national
interests, did not allow for a close relationship. While combatant rights
would have forced the enemy to take prisoners, refusing combatant rights
resulted in the execution of many armed Poles within and outside of
Warsaw. It was not until August 2, 1944 after the uprising had begun, that
England announced that the insurgents had combatant rights. This was in
response to the Germans who were using Polish prisoners and civilians as
shields in front of their tanks and infantry.(25) Regardless, the Germans did
not follow the rules of war and continued to shield their military with Polish

civilians and insurgents. It was not until October 2, 1944 that Poles were
granted combatant rights by Germany, and this was conditional on the
surrender of the AK.
The decision for the uprising was maturing in the midst a lot of tension. The
leadership of underground Poland knew that a premature Uprising would
allow the Germans to crush it while a late one would deprive the legal
government in London of influence over the course of action.
One incident which precipitated the uprising was the Communist call for
arms. Just before the uprising Communist radio made several broadcasts. On
April 29, the Moscow Radio in a Polish edition called for Poles to "Raise up
arms! There is no time to be lost." The following day another message was
transmitted. It said "Let the millions of Warsowians become a million
soldiers who will force away the German occupant and win their liberty." On
July 30, the Polish Workers' Party spread this propaganda, "Warsowians,
raise up arms. Alert the whole city and every neighborhood. Raise up
militarily."(26) These messages and others were transmitted over five times
a day just prior to the Rising. The Communist PPR also tried to stir tensions
by announcing that the leadership of the AK ran away from Warsaw, when
in fact they remained in the city. Communist propaganda also called for the
Polish people to assist the PPR in their rising against the Germans. This
proclamation was written all over the walls of Warsaw and may have
prematurely alerted the Germans of the uprising.(27) In a situation where a
large proportion of the inhabitants of the capital were eager to fight there
existed a danger that the spontaneous military operation of the communists
would create an uprising under their leadership. This was additional pressure
for the AK command.
The Germans wanted to avoid an uprising, but their methods of trying to
silence the possible insurgents placed the AK under a lot of tension. The
Germans, who already knew that an uprising was to take place as early as
the 25th of July, began to take precautions and doubled their patrols. Night
curfews were more stringently enforced. It was common for German patrols
to round up the men, shoot them on the spot or possibly deport them to
concentration camps. Furthermore, the Germans hung posters around the
city asking for one hundred thousand able bodied men for labor putting up
fortifications against the advancing Red Army. The Germans were
unsuccessful at gathering these men. These able bodied men were apparently
more willing to fight against the Germans than help them. Possibly many of
them knew that it was just an easy way to gather and detain the Polish
people who were of age and physical strength to fight. In addition, tile AK
was afraid that the Germans would uncover their weapon caches which were
being prepared in the basements of ruined buildings.

This fear was perpetuated when German officials uncovered 70,000
grenades and 450 flame throwers that were to be used by the insurgents
hidden in basements of abandoned buildings.(28) The basements were then
flooded and many men died. The AK feared that the Germans might uncover
more of their weapons, and they had very few to spare. Lastly, the AK
command was informed on July 30 that four German tank divisions were
approaching Warsaw. These were to be used against the advancing Red
Army and could have easily been used against the insurgents.(29) This
constant pressure called for an uprising to be staged as soon as possible.
In the morning of July 30 the chief commander of the AK, General Bor, met
with the Rada Jednosci Narodowej (RJN) also known as the Committee for
National Unity which wanted to join in an alliance with Britain, France and
the United States. This committee was made up of civilians and was separate
form the AK but it cooperated with the Home Army. It was responsible for
the consolidation of the civilian side of tile Polish Underground, the
distribution of food and clothing, and in charge of maintaining some sort of
order within the city. The Committee also wanted to maintain good relations
with the Soviet Union as long as the Soviets did not interfere with the
internal affairs of Poland. In addition, they wanted to establish a centralized
constitutional democracy, an apolitical army and equal rights for minorities.
At the meeting General Bor related that the Red Army was spotted in
Grochow, a suburb of Warsaw. That same day, at six o'clock in the
afternoon, Colonel Monter-Chrusciel reported that Russian tanks were
spotted in Praga, another suburb of Warsaw. A courier who was in Warsaw
at this time reported that "the speed of the Russian advance had caused the
Germans to hasten their slaughter of Hungarian Jews and Poles," which was
yet another factor which precipitated the uprising.(30) It was then decided
that the Warsaw Uprising would start on August I at five o'clock in the
afternoon, also known as "W" hour.(31)
On August 1, 1944 at five o'clock in the afternoon, in the streets of Warsaw,
the AK began an Uprising against the German occupants. The battle lasted
for sixty three days. During these sixty three days Warsaw was destroyed
systematically while the inhabitants were murdered one by one. Fires and
explosions were everywhere. "The thick clouds of smoke were over the
capital as if they wanted to cover up the inequality of the fighting
underneath."(32) The AK had few guns and little ammunition. The citizens
living without water, gas and electricity, feeding upon rotten wheat, also
stood up to tile Germans. With their empty hands young men, women and
children rose against tanks and guns, Their motto was "Whoever wins will
be free, whoever dies is free already."(33) After sixty three days Warsaw
fell.
In the Warsaw Uprising over 200,000 people were killed and thousands
more removed to German concentration camps during their fight for

freedom. Those who survived had nothing left. Their city was turned into
ruins.
Many will say that the Warsaw Uprising was premature and that is why it
failed. This is inaccurate. The uprising was not premature. The approaching
Red Army signified hope for the Warsowians. Fighting in the rear ranks of
the retreating German Army meant an easier victory than fighting them
directly during the occupation. The unbearable living conditions and
constant oppression by German officials placed the civilian population
pleading and demanding help from the AK and the Polish government. All
of these factors preceding the uprising are clear examples that the uprising
was bound to occur. Others say that the uprising was premature because the
insurgents were ill equipped and did not posses a strict chain of command
which meant that it was difficult to coordinate the resistance effort. This is
true; the AK was organized from separate insurgent groups fighting under
the title of AK, and they were not equipped to take on the Germans alone,
but at the time of the uprising, the AK had more weapons and ammunition
than it ever had at any time during the war. In addition at the time of the
uprising the AK was as well unified as it ever was. It contained one of the
largest unified resistance groups in Europe. Furthermore, the New York
times on August 3, 1944 wrote that, "Warsaw and even Germans themselves
do not believe liberation is far off."(34) The AK could not wait any longer.
Waiting would not bring them more weapons nor any more soldiers. In fact
their numbers were ever so slowly diminishing due to the German
executions and concentration camps. In addition, their weapon and
ammunition garrisons were under the threat of discovery. Waiting was
nothing more than passively accepting one's own death. The uprising was
bound to occur. Its failure is attributed to several different reasons.
To begin with, the AK was anticipating a quick victory unaware of the full
strength of the Germans in Warsaw. The AK was severely deficient in
equipment and tactics compared to the Germans. The AK possessed only
those weapons they had saved from the 1939 defeat, those weapons which
they stole and those which they bought from avaricious Germans.(35) A
large portion of their weapons was stored outside of Warsaw to be used in
other parts of Poland. These weapons would never reach Warsaw after the
Uprising began because it was almost impossible to cross the Wisla in large
numbers without being seen. According to several members of the AK
Headquarters the available equipment consisted of the following:
1,000 carbines
300 pistols
60 light machine guns
7 heavy machine guns
35 special carbines and bazookas

1,700 revolvers
25,000 hand-grenades
The number of soldiers actually fighting for the AK within Warsaw was
estimated between 36,000 and 40,000 which would allow approximately 10
percent of the force to be armed at one time. Tile need for ammunition was
even more desperate. On August 1, 1944 the following was available:
35 bullets to a pistol
300 bullets for a machine pistol
50 shells for anti-armour cannon (but not even one cannon)
190 pieces of ammunition per carbine
500 round of ammunition for a light machine gun
2,300 rounds for the heavy machine guns(36)
Due to this scarcity every piece of ammunition was cherished dearly. A
poster circulated among the Polish resistance fighters, illustrated a skeleton
wearing a German helmet. Underneath it read "For every German, one
bullet." These posters were intended to be taken seriously. Wasting
ammunition would have meant punishment and possible confiscation of the
weapon and ammunition. To save ammunition, bricks were dropped onto
patrolling SS men, and stones were used to bludgeon any German who was
unfortunate enough to be caught with his guard down. Hand-made grenades,
constructed of nuts and bolts wrapped in socks were used, but were often too
bulky to throw. Cocktail bombs were also used when hand-grenades ran out.
Their ingenuity was boundless; unfortunately they needed more than just
creativity and strong will to win a battle. They needed weapons and
ammunition that would match those of the Germans. One just can not fight a
tank with sticks and stones, as some people did. Overall the insurgents had
enough ammunition to last for only three days. The New York Times on
August 4, 1944 claimed that "the underground forces could not reduce the
German fortifications because of the scarcity of weapons, especially heavy
ones."(37) Ninety percent of the soldiers were therefore treated as reserves.
The insurgents were also deficient tactically. Because of tile difficulty with
communication, it was hard to coordinate the whole effort. In fact, due to
misunderstanding, deep enthusiasm and insufficient lines of communication
(meaning the sewers), some insurgents began firing on the Germans as early
as 1:30 in tile afternoon on August 1, 1944. During the first few days of the
fighting the AK was fighting in groups that were too small to take any
important German strongpoints. By the time the AK had realized their
errors, the Germans were able to coordinate their efforts toward fortifying
strategic points such as bridges and airports. Instead of focusing their efforts
on such strongpoints the forces were scattered around tile city and much of
their energy went into fighting for each and every building and block
regardless of importance. It seems that they focused too much on fighting

the individual soldier when they should have been taking bridges, prisons,
and important fortifications.(38) Another error may have been the reluctance
to retreat. General Monter, who personally commanded the forces in the city
of Warsaw, ordered that no man shall retreat even when the odds are greatly
against them. I am sure that each man was willing to fight to the end, but I
am not sure whether this is the right attitude to have when you have no
weapons and you are outnumbered. General Monter was stubborn when it
came to retreating and often General Bor himself had to order Monter to
withdraw. This reluctance may have cost the AK many unnecessary
casualties.
As I have already mentioned the British failed to provide military assistance
to the AK, but they did attempt to provide air assistance by dropping
supplies. Supplies were sent by British aircraft which took off from Britain,
Italy and Africa. Both Polish and British airmen volunteered for these
missions. While their efforts should be seen as heroic, the resistance that
they faced prevented any meaningful assistance to reach tile insurgents.
Many British pilots who flew over Warsaw were hesitant to go back
complaining bitterly, "that Russians were actually firing on them."(39) They
claimed that the barrage of artillery was coming from both the German and
Russian sides of the front. Of course, in addition to them having to dodge
friendly fire, the pilots had to avoid being shot down by the Germans.
German artillery and guns showered any enemy planes that penetrated
Warsaw airspace. German fighter planes threatened any bomber squadrons
or supply planes which dared enter without air support. It was estimated that
approximately sixty percent of the aircraft sent to Warsaw did not return,
while flights to other German occupied countries had no losses. Planes that
did return were full of bullet holes. "Even parachutes inside the planes were
riddled by German bullets or explosives."(40) The alternative was to land
planes on Soviet occupied territory after making the airdrops which would
allow for short range fighters to assist the supply missions. Unfortunately,
Stalin forbade any allied planes from landing on Soviet soil and refused to
make any air drops. Of the very few supplies that made it to Warsaw, 90
percent of them fell into German hands. After one and a half months of
fighting, and a lot pressure from the allied forces and growing publicity, the
Soviets reluctantly agreed to make air drops into Warsaw. I do not suppose
the Russians were too helpful when they decided to make the air drops but
on September 14, when Russian planes suddenly appeared over Warsaw
with them came a hail of crashing containers. Their parachutes failed to
open.(41) The insufficient air support was, therefore, another reason why the
Uprising failed.
Some claim that the English were responsible for providing the Poles with
military assistance in the event of an invasion as was stipulated in the
Versailles Treaty. They did just that in 1939 when Poland was invaded by
Germany. The conditions were different in 1944 when the Poles decided to

stage an uprising. First of all, Poland was not invaded in 1944, it was already
occupied by the Germans. Technically, Poland did not exist. Certainly
Russians were "opposed to the Polish London Government which is
acknowledged by the underground." Secondly, the British did attempt to
provide aid to those insurgents who remained united under the AK by
dropping supplies whenever it was possible. Unfortunately it was not enough
to fulfill the insurgent's needs. The fact that they did not allow the Polish
paratroops brigade to invade Warsaw might have meant that England was
concerned about the lives of those troops. After all, if an airplane dropping
supplies returns riddled with bullets, what are the chances of several
thousand soldiers trying to jump out of these planes into streams of artillery
fire? They would be sitting ducks. Their chances of making it may have been
minimal if any. Lastly, I believe the allied western front was a reasonable
attempt at providing aid to the Poles. Tile purpose was to defeat Germany as
a whole and provide independence to France, Belgium, Poland, among a few
nations occupied by Germany, not just to liberate the Warsowians from
German occupation.
Finally, many Poles blame the failure of the uprising on tile Russians. After
the Tehran Conference Russo-Polish relations were believed to be improved.
The AK on the eve of the uprising was aware that the Soviet Army was
approaching Warsaw. They expected them to enter anywhere between
August 1st and August 4th. Unfortunately, the Soviets did not enter Warsaw
until January 1945, five months later.
Many Polish historians say that the Russians purposely waited until the AK
was suppressed so that they would be able to enter and take Warsaw for
themselves. While the Soviets probably did want to take Warsaw, this was a
secondary objective. Their first objective was to drive the Germans as far
west as possible and occupy as much Polish and German territory as they
could in a short period of time. Therefore, it was an inconvenience for them
to stop at the outskirts of Warsaw to wait for three months if they were
physically able to advance.
The Russians claim that they were stopped by the German Army. By the
time the Russians reached Warsaw the Germans had sent four extra tank
divisions to stop the advancing Russians. General Heinz Guderian stated,
"We Germans had the impression that it was our defenses that halted the
enemy rather than a Russian desire to sabotage the Warsaw Uprising."(42) It
was the perception of the Russians that a military halt would allow the
United States and England to seize the bulk of German territory. The Soviet
gains would then depend upon the location of the Russian Army at the end
of the war.
The Warsaw Uprising fell short of its goal. But the blame can not be focused
on any one nation or group of people. The blame falls on everyone.

Roosevelt could have taken more time and influence to negotiate the future
boundaries of Poland instead of depending on the UN to settle the Polish
question. The English, who would not take a stand on most issues without
the approval of the United States, could have taken a firmer stand against
Russian Diplomacy. The Polish government in London also failed to provide
the AK with pertinent information. Because the main concern was weapons,
ammunition and possibly ground support the Soviets would not have
provided these due to their objective to take Warsaw. They opposed the
Polish government in exile and they wanted to occupy as much territory as
possible. They could not have accomplished this if they collaborated with
the AK It was foolish to think that the Soviets would have provided the
Poles with guns and ammunition which later could have been used against
them. This is one reason why the Russians failed to recognize the AK as a
combatant group. Independent national interest ultimately led to the failure
of the Warsaw Uprising.
Moreover, I believe the Uprising was worthwhile, no matter that it failed.
Unfortunately many people died during this rising, but many people would
have died without the uprising. Some may ask, why not wait for the Soviets
to liberate Poland? The answer is simple. Russia invaded Poland in 1939.
They were hostile to them throughout the war killing tens of thousands of
Polish officers. Only when Germany attacked Russia in 1941 did the Soviets
look at Poland as an ally. After Germany was no longer a threat to Russia,
Stalin once again began eliminating Polish resistance. The question should
be why was the Polish government so naive as to depend so much on Stalin's
Army? Under Soviet liberation Poland was allowed to keep its name but its
soul was stolen from them.
The Uprising was worthwhile because it established Polish identity in a time
when Poland was practically wiped off the map. Peaceful negotiations
obviously did not accomplish the desired results, Resistance was the only
option opened to the Poles. They wanted independence as they have always
wanted it in the past and no one was able to give it to them or even help
them achieve it. Poland gained its independence after World War I through
the Treaty of Versaille. After World War 11, Poland was not afforded this
luxury. I believe the resistance movement and every other act of
independence throughout history, on the part of the Polish nation is an
example that Poland exists and will always exist in body, mind and spirit.
And it is in my opinion that these acts of resistance led to the liberation of
Poland in the 1980's.
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